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“…in any community in which class distinctions are somewhat 
vague, all canons of reputability and decency, and all standards of 
consumption, are traced back by insensible gradations to the 
usages and habits of thoughts of the highest social and pecuniary 
class -- the wealthy leisure class” (T. Veblen 1899: 104) 
 
“The downturn is likely to be so severe partly because we have 
succumbed to the opinion that markets work best by themselves, 
unfettered by government regulators.  But the people making this 
argument are the ones who have been served well by it” (J. Stiglitz 
2008: 36) 
 
 “An imbalance between rich and poor is the oldest and most fatal 
ailment of all republics” (Plutarch c. 46 A.D.-127 A.D; source 
unknown). 
 
ABSTRACT:   The current financial crisis has been blamed on inadequate regulation stemming 
from laissez-faire ideology, combined with low interest rates.  But beneath these widely-
acknowledged causal factors lies a deeper underlying determining cause that has received less 
notice:  the dramatic increase in inequality in the U.S. over the preceding 35 years.  This rise in 
inequality generated three phenomena that heightened conditions in which this crisis could 
occur.  The first is that greater inequality meant that individuals were forced to struggle harder 
to find ways to consume more to maintain their relative social status.  The consequence was that 
over the preceding three decades household saving rates plummeted, workers worked longer 
hours, and households took on ever-greater debt. The second phenomenon is that, flush with 
ever greater income and wealth, the elite were able to flood financial markets with credit, 
helping keep interest rates low and encouraging the creation of new credit instruments.  The 
third phenomenon is that, as the rich took larger shares of income and wealth, they gained 
relatively more command over everything, including ideology.  Reducing the size of government, 
deregulating the economy, and failing to regulate newly evolving credit instruments flowed out 
of this ideology. 
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  The current financial crisis has been blamed on deregulation, inadequate oversight 
resulting from laissez-faire ideology, and low interest rates.
1  Although these claims are true, 
they represent a surface reality, beneath which lies a deeper determining cause of the conditions 
in which such a crisis might occur.  This deeper cause is the dramatic increase in inequality over 
the past 35 years.    This rise in inequality generated three phenomena that underlie today’s 
crisis: a demand effect, a supply effect, and a changing of the rules of the game.  The first, or the 
demand effect is that greater inequality meant that individuals were forced to find ways to 
consume more to maintain their relative status, their social respectability.  Pressure to do so was 
especially strong in housing, the most important symbol of status for most Americans.  As a 
consequence, over the past three decades the household saving rate plummeted, workers worked 
longer hours, and households took on ever-greater debt. 
  The second phenomenon – the supply effect -- results from what the elite did with its 
ever-greater share of income and wealth.  Much, of course, was spent on an orgy of luxury 
consumption, propelling the first phenomenon.  The remainder fueled first a stock market boom, 
and then after the high tech bubble burst, a real estate boom.  It also flooded markets with credit, 
helping keep interest rates low and encouraging the creation new high-risk credit instruments.   
The third phenomenon – the changing of the rules of the game -- is that as the rich took 
an ever-greater share of income and wealth, they gained relatively more command over 
everything, including ideology.  In their competition for status among themselves, they 
understandably supported measures that brought them yet greater shares of the nation’s income 
and wealth.  They spontaneously gravitated toward political and economic doctrines that were 
supportive of their self-interests.  And as their command over essentially everything grew, so too   3
did their ability to craft self-serving ideology that would become ever-more convincing to a 
majority of the electorate.  Their rising control over the media, educational institutions and think 
tanks made this outcome inevitable.  Flowing out of this ideology were tax cuts favoring the 
wealthy, a weakened safety net, deregulation of the economy, and the failure to regulate newly 
evolving credit instruments. 
  The argument explored here is not that all financial crises are in part due to rising 
inequality.  The more modest claim is that some are and that this is one of those instances. 
Rising Inequality and Status Insecurity 
  In the U.S. since colonial times, there has been a relatively strong belief that vertical 
mobility is readily possible.  Consequently, Americans generally feel responsible for their own 
social status.  If they are willing to put forth sufficient effort, they may improve their status.  
Through adequate dedication and effort, anyone can move up, even to the very highest levels of 
social status.  It is the individual’s responsibility.  It depends upon the individual’s willingness to 
study and work hard.  One’s social status is not given, but earned.   
However, how hard one works is generally not directly observable.  What more readily 
catches attention is how much one can consume, which can stand, more or less, as a proxy for 
how hard one has worked.
2  Thus, because Americans believe they are individually responsible 
for their own social standing, they feel strongly compelled to demonstrate status and hence class 
identity through consumption.  Greater inequality means that consumers must stretch further to 
maintain their relative social standing. 
  A substantial increase in inequality could be expected to prompt households to respond in 
one or more of three ways:  People might consume more of their incomes, forcing them to save 
less; they might become more indebted to enable greater consumption; and they might increase   4
the hours they work to enable them to increase their income and hence consumption levels.  As 
the evidence presented below demonstrates, as a whole U.S. households did all three.  
Over the three decades following World War II, the U.S. became a more egalitarian 
society.  Between 1946 and 1976, inflation-adjusted per capita income increased by about 90 
percent.  For the bottom 90 percent of households it increased by 83 percent, but only by 20 
percent for the top one percent.  However, over the following three decades -- between 1976 and 
2006 – whereas inflation-adjusted per capita income increased by 64 percent, for the bottom 90 
percent of households it increased only by 10 percent.  For the top one percent of households it 
increased a whopping 232 percent.
3  A more detailed breakdown of this rising inequality can be 
seen in Table I below. 
TABLE I
4   
Increases in Real income and percent increases by income group: 









Average weekly earnings (in 1982 dollars) declined from $331.39 in 1973 to $275.93 in   5
2005, thereby greatly lagging behind productivity gains (Miringoff and Opdyke 2008: 226).   
Inequality in wealth ownership is yet far greater, and has also greatly increased (Wolff 
2002).  It has been estimated that on the eve of the American Revolution, the top one percent of 
households held about 15 percent of all wealth.  By the end of the Civil War, they may have held 
25 percent (DeLong 1997).  Since the Civil War, as shown in Figure 2 below, there have been 
three major expansions in the share of wealth held by the super-rich: The first occurred between 
the end of the Civil War and lasted until about 1900.  It was this explosion in inequality and the 
behavior that accompanied it that led Veblen to write his most noted work, Theory of The 
Leisure Class, in which he unfolded his theory of conspicuous consumption.  The second major 
expansion in the share of wealth held by the super-rich occurred following World War I and 
lasted until the late 1920s.  The last expansion began in the early 1970s and lasted up until the 
present crisis. The first two periods of rapidly rising inequality were called, respectively, the 
“Gilded Age,” and the “Roaring Twenties,” suggesting the consumption orgies of the rich that 
accompanied these periods.  The last period has yet to acquire a sobriquet that has stuck.  Like 
the two earlier periods, it also witnessed extravagant consumption by the very rich, which was 
emulated by those further down the ladder as they struggled to maintain relative status.   6
Figure 1: Crude Estimates of the Top 1% Share of National Wealth 
 
Source: DeLong, Bradford 1997 
 
  It is worth noting that while income inequality alone makes it more difficult for 
households to maintain their relative status, this struggle would have been less difficult had the 
potential for vertical mobility increased over this period.  However, it appears that the potential 
for upward mobility actually decreased, thereby compounding the difficulty that most Americans 
faced in maintaining status (Bradbury and Katz 2002: 4). Thus, not only did the differences 
between income brackets rise, but it also become more difficult for American families to move 
into higher income brackets.
5 
  Where there is a strong belief that vertical mobility is possible, growing inequality puts 
additional pressure on households to struggle ever harder to maintain their relative status or 
demonstrate higher status through consumption.  Increasing inequality means the status standard 
is ever higher. 
The struggle to keep up was especially intense in housing.  As those at the pinnacle of   7
wealth and income competed among themselves for status, they bought and had constructed 
ever-larger mansions, thereby degrading the status quality of homes owned or occupied by 
everyone beneath them. Houses and cars are principal symbols of status and in the last decades 
leading up to the crisis there was an explosion in the consumption of so-called McMansions and 
extremely expensive cars.  Not surprisingly, a February 2008 Pew survey found that  “the 
proportion of wealthy Americans who say they are very satisfied with their housing and cars, in 
particular, has declined considerably since 2001” (Pew Research Center 2008). 
 As those below struggled to maintain their relative status by upgrading their own 
housing, the housing boom was born.  The longer the boom continued, the greater became the 
belief that housing was also a solid investment, a belief strongly encouraged by the real estate 
industry.  However, rising housing prices made all housing more expensive, with the result being 
that the housing affordability index declined from 147.3 in 1970 to 111.8 in 2005 (Miringoff and 
Opdyke (2008: 233).
6     
A “free-to-choose” interpretation does not adequately capture the dynamics of this 
intensified struggle.  People do, of course, choose.  However, as Robert Frank has noted, their 
choices are socially constrained: 
“Increased spending at the top of the income distribution has not only imposed 
psychological costs on families in the middle, it has also raised the cost of achieving 
many basic goals.  Few middle-income parents, for example, would be comfortable 
knowing that their children were attending below-average schools.  Yet the amount that 
any given family must spend to avoid that outcome depends strongly on the amounts that 
others spend….  [Moreover], people cannot send their children to a public school of even 
average quality if they buy a home in a school district in which house prices are well   8
below average” (2000: 258). 
  This dynamic has also been noted by Christopher Lasch (1996).  As economic elites took 
an ever-greater share of income and wealth, they tended to isolate themselves in social enclaves 
such as gated communities, exclusive clubs, and private schools.  They tended to work in jobs, 
live in neighborhoods, and move in circles where they literally did not see those struggling to 
stay on their feet.  Because of elites’ disproportionate political power, this withdrawal from the 
wider society and from direct contact with the concerns of less-well-off citizens eroded support 
for public services on which those further down the economic ladder depended -- services such 
as schools, parks, transportation, even public safety.  The decay of public services encouraged 
those beneath the elites to do what was necessary – reduce saving, become more indebted, or 
increase work hours – to enable them to send their children to decent schools or to safe 
recreational facilities.  And, of course, as those who could afford to consume the private 
provision of these services opted out of consuming the public ones, political support for, and the 
quality of, the latter continued to deteriorate.  A vicious cycle was set in motion promising 
increasingly inferior public goods and ever-greater pressure to increase consumption of private 
substitutes. 
As inequality increased over the three decades preceding the crisis, the struggle by 
households to maintain their relative status resulted in reduced saving, greater indebtedness, and 
longer work weeks.  The personal saving rate fell from 10.4 percent in 1980-84, to 7.7 percent in 
1985-89, to 6.5 percent in 1990-94, to 3.8 percent in 1995-99, to 2.1 percent in 2000-04; and in 
2005 and 2006, the rates were actually negative, -0.4 and -1.0 percent, respectively
7 (See also 
Figure 3 below).
8     9
Figure 3: Personal Savings Rate











  As inequality increased, households also took on more debt.  Average consumer debt in 
2003 dollars for Americans over 15 years of age increased from $712 in 1980 to $3,261 in 2003 
(Adkisson and McFerrin 2005: 447).   This debt especially grew between the early 1990s and 
2007 as household spending grew considerably faster than incomes.  This was due not only to 
stagnating wages, but also to the easier access to credit cards
9 and more aggressive mortgage 
lenders.
10  
This increased indebtedness held for households in all income quintiles.  Not 
unexpectedly, the lower the quintile, the higher the level of indebtedness (See Table II below).  
Although there are other hypotheses for why indebtedness of those in the lower part of the 
income distribution increased (e.g., Weller 2007), the rise in indebtedness for the rich and poor 
alike fits the hypothesis set forth here: that in a society in which vertical mobility is believed to   10
be highly fluid, increasing gaps in income all along the spectrum would stimulate everyone to 
struggle harder to meet their consumption status targets,
11 as those at the very top compete 
among themselves for the very pinnacle of status.   
  It is noteworthy that increasing income and wealth inequality occurred even in the 
highest income decile, with the consequence that even those in this decile became, on average, 
increasingly indebted.  The greatest gains in wealth and income were for the super-rich, the top 
0.1 percent or one tenth of the top one percent (Wolff 2002), dramatically increasing the 
consumption of extremely expensive goods and services (mansions, private jets, Hirschian 
positional goods, etc.).  These super-rich households were in competition with each other for the 
very acme of status, demonstrating that “In the consumer race the finishing line always moves 
faster than the fastest of runners” (Bauman 2000: 72).  This put pressure on the lesser rich who 
also wish to be seen as at the very top.   This pressure was reinforced by the advertising and 
programming that continually keep the consumption standards of the rich and famous on public 
display (See Schor 1998; Frank 1999). 
 
TABLE II 
Ratio of the Mean Value of Outstanding Debts to  




1989  1992 1995 1998 2001 2004  2007 
All Families  0.88  1.08 1.09 1.20 1.05 1.47  1.50 
< 20  0.89  0.33 1.85 1.84 1.68 2.31  2.56 
20‐39.9  0.86  0.35 1.12 1.23 1.12 1.62  1.54   11
40‐59.9  0.85  0.42 1.03 1.19 1.18 1.61  1.72 
60‐79.9  0.96  0.71 1.14 1.32 1.16 1.56  1.82 
80‐89.9  0.84  0.85 1.08 1.14 1.12 1.47  1.77 
90‐100  0.60  0.62 0.76 0.79 0.68 0.99  0.87 
 
Source: Survey of Consumer Finances 
 
  If, as a consequence of rising inequality, individuals had to spend ever more to attain 
their status targets, then it might also be expected that they would have increased their work 
hours to be better able to do so.  Indeed, as inequality rose dramatically between 1970 and 2002, 
work hours per capita rose 20 percent in the U.S.  By contrast, in the European Union where 
income inequality had not much changed, work hours fell 12 percent (OECD 2004, Chapter 1).  
This  relationship is supported by a study that found “that increased inequality induces people to 
work longer hours [and] …the underlying cause is the Veblen effect of the consumption of the 
rich on the behaviour of those less well off” (Bowles and Park 2005: F410).   
Growing Inequality and Parking the Surplus 
  Over the past three decades, the increased share of income and wealth accruing to an elite 
was far greater than could readily be spent, even on the most lavish consumption.  Thus the elite 
had additional saving and they and their money managers sought to place these increased assets 
to maximum effect.  But given the fact that those who spend most or all of their income had a 
smaller share of total income to spend, profitable investment potential in the real economy was 
limited.  In his memoirs, Alan Greenspan took note of this lack of profitable investment outlets:  
“intended investment in the United States has been lagging in recent years, judging from the   12
larger share of internal cash flow that has been returned to shareholders, presumably for lack 
of new investment opportunities” (2007: 387).   
  The financial crisis was able to sneak up on the economy because the dominant focus was 
on surface reality, on the fact, for instance, that between 1991 and 2006 growth averaged 3.22 
percent and inflation never went above four percent.  However, beneath the surface, dramatically 
rising inequality was shifting investment from production to speculation.
12  
Indeed, in the six or so years preceding the crisis, firms were investing less than their 
retained earnings – the longest period of such business behavior since the second world war --, 
even as corporate profits as a share of national income nearly doubled.  But these profits 
occurred principally in the financial sector.  Whereas financial sector profits have generally 
constituted about 10-15 percent of corporate profit, they jumped to 40 percent in 2007 (Stiglitz 
2008: 36).
13  These profits came from such sources as the hefty transactions fees banks earned 
every time loans were sold, re-packaged and securitized.  Profit inflation, augmented by 
collateralized debt, accompanied stagnating incomes for workers as the rich took ever-larger 
shares of total income.  Whereas finance and insurance accounted for less than four percent of 
GDP in the 1960s, it had risen to about eight percent by the eve of the crisis (Krugman 2009). 
  This lack of new investment opportunities in the real economy created a premium for 
financial entrepreneurs devising new financial investment instruments such as hedge funds, 
designed to “hedge” against risk, that were only made available to an elite sector of private 
investors and institutions.  Traditionally, banks that originated loans held them until maturity, 
providing good cause to scrutinize well the credit worthiness of the borrower.  What changed is 
that financial entities began to buy up mortgages and credit card debt and then package them in 
bonds backed by the monthly payments of the mortgage borrowers and credit card repayments.
14   13
Lending banks no longer needed to be as cautious as to the borrower’s credit risk. 
Nevertheless, this process of “securitization” was widely believed to strengthen the financial 
system by spreading risk more broadly. These bonds were then divided into various tranches 
based on their degree of risk. 
  These new tools encouraged more and more wealth to be held in the form of financial 
assets.  Along with the booming high tech stocks of the late 1990s, financial assets seemed the 
most promising way to hold one’s wealth and make it grow.   Indeed, such instruments as hedge 
funds seemed a low risk alternative or complement to the sizzling tech stock market.   
  With more wealth in the hands of those with less to lose from risky investments, the total 
amount of wealth held in stocks as a share of total assets more than doubled from 1983 to the 
crash in 2001 (Wolff, 2004: 11).
15  By holding more wealth in the form of stocks, investors 
scrambled for ever-higher returns from these investments, generating the tech bubble of the late 
1990s. While the bursting of this bubble did have some repercussions on the real sector, because 
the bubble was mostly limited to the stock market, its impact was primarily felt by those with 
money to invest, i.e. those in higher income brackets. In addition, an expanding housing market 
continued to grow through the bursting of the tech bubble, tempering the severity of the 2001 
recession (See Figure 4). The growth of financial assets as a percentage of total assets stopped 
and reversed following the mild recession of 2001 (see Figure 5) (Bucks 2006, A10).  More and 
more wealth was redirected into nonfinancial assets, especially real estate.
16  Between 2001 and 
2007, the market value of both “Primary residence” and “Other residential property” went up as 
a percentage of total assets (see Figure 6)(Bucks 2009, A28). 
 
Figure 4: S&P/Case-Shiller U.S. National Home Price Index with S&P 500 Index   14
 
 
Source: Standard and Poor’s/ Case-Shiller Home Price Indices and S&P500 Index. 
The black arrow indicates the beginning of the 2001 recession. There is clearly little effect on 
the growth of housing prices. 
Figure 5 
   15
 
Source: Survey of Consumer Finances 1992-2007. 
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Source: Survey of Consumer Finances 1992-2007. 
 
While the preceding statements and graphs show an important trend in wealth holdings 
following the 2001 crash, the more important story is what the wealthy did with their assets in 
the years leading up to the crash. From 1995 to1998, the 90-100 percentile income bracket led 
the charge into financial markets, both by altering their own wealth portfolios and biting out a 
bigger chunk of overall financial wealth. The top ten income percentile from 1995 to1998 was 
clearly out ahead of other income brackets in moving into financial markets and obtaining a 
larger share of overall financial wealth.  Emulating their richer cohorts in the following period 
(1998-2001), almost every other income bracket increased its share of total financial wealth (see 
Figure 7). This same pattern appears in comparing the wealth portfolios of different income 
brackets over time. The top income bracket made a more drastic shift towards holding its wealth 
in stocks and investment funds than any other income bracket from 1995 to 1998, increasing the 
share that these assets had in wealth portfolios by nearly 6 percent (See Figure 8). Both of these 
measurements show a clear behavioral difference between the rich and the rest of the population, 
with the rich jumping into financial markets first, followed by the emulative behavior of lower 
income brackets. 
Figure 7   17
 
























Source: Survey of Consumer Finances 2007 (Public Data, 2007 dollar adjusted). 
From 1998 to 2001, almost all income brackets moved towards favoring financial forms 
of wealth. The only income bracket that showed a clear behavioral difference (again) was the top 
10 percent. This wealthiest decile acquired a larger percentage chunk of all real estate from 
1998-2001, when other income brackets were moving relatively away from real estate (see 
Figure 9). In addition, the percentage change in the top 10 percent’s value of real estate wealth 
increased more than was the case in any other income bracket during this same period (see 
Figure 10). Once again, the other income brackets followed the actions of the rich in the 
following period, 2001-2004, as can be seen in both Figure 9 and Figure 10. 
Figure 9   19
 
Source: Survey of Consumer Finances 2007 (Public Data, 2007 dollar adjusted). 
 
Figure 10   20
 
Source: Survey of Consumer Finances 2007 (Public Data, 2007 dollar adjusted). 
The very wealthiest decile appears to be ahead of the curve in making investment 
decisions.  This is to be expected given their generally superior educations and their capacity to 
hire the most talented financial advisors.  This elite led the way in generating the next investment 
boom. This is most apparent in Figure 9. With ever-larger shares of total wealth, the elite had 
first flooded the stock market with liquidity.  However, as if foreseeing pending difficulties in 
the stock market, they began to shift funds into the real estate market, turning it into an 
increasingly frothy speculative domain. Their actions  set the stage set for the housing bubble to 
take over where the tech boom left off, enabling it to take the place of the stock market in driving 
the economic expansion.
17  As noted earlier, the top income decile was the only income bracket 
to move a significant portion of wealth from financial holdings into real estate from 1998 to 
2001, the three years preceding the stock market crash.    21
With a plethora of credit fueled by overly expansionary monetary policy, inflow of 
foreign monies, and greater use of financial instruments, financial institutions were not under 
pressure to limit lending to those who could realistically meet their debt obligations, since these 
loans would be bundled or securitized and sold.   Increased credit availability allowed those in 
lower income quintiles to obtain mortgages to pay for increasingly inflated housing prices.  A 
Ponzi-like scenario developed in which it was actually in the best short-run interests of banks to 
issue more debt, ignoring previous debt-holding requirements for consumers in order to prevent 
the system from collapsing.  Mortgage lenders saw great short-term gain potential in these sky-
rocketing housing prices.  But when low income borrowers could not make their mortgage 
payments, the collapse was assured.  
A slowdown in the growth of housing prices or an increase in lending discipline might 
have tempered or even precluded the financial collapse of 2008.  What promised to make the 
crisis severe was the breadth of participation.  Almost 69 percent of the population invests in real 
estate through ownership of their primary residence,
18  As the elite poured much of its increasing 
share of income and wealth into the real estate market, an extreme speculator’s market evolved 
in the highly deregulated environment of the early 21
st century (Bucks, 2009: A29).
 19  It was 
destined to collapse. 
A Larger Slice and Command of Ideology 
Different income and wealth groups have different interests and these interests are 
captured in ideologies that compete in the public sphere.  The generation and dissemination of 
ideology requires resources. 
The wealth of the rich means that they can command relatively more of everything and 
this everything includes the wherewithal to take ever-greater or better shares for themselves.    22
They get the best medical care, the best living space and neighborhoods, the best jobs, the best 
educations, the most gifted friends and acquaintances, and the most political influence.  And all 
of this privilege makes them on average more astute and successful in attaining their interests 
than less-privileged citizens.   
  How might they be expected to use their disproportionate advantages from upbringing, 
education, and power?  Generally, in pursuit of their own self-interests, which in their 
competition for status among themselves means supporting measures that bring them ever-
greater shares of the nation’s wealth.  They spontaneously gravitate toward political and 
economic doctrines that are supportive of their self-interests.  And their more sophisticated 
educations mean that they are less likely to be fooled as to just what these self-interests are. 
  The rich do not, of course, opportunistically pursue their own interests any more than do 
other folks.  But their privileged status and greater resources mean they can do it better.  And, 
like folks generally, they do not see themselves as consciously doing so.  All people want to be 
highly principled, to see themselves as supporting the causes of the good and just society.  They 
come to believe quite sincerely that the economic doctrines they support are best for the country, 
for its freedoms, its fundamental values, and in fact, best for the future well-being of all 
humanity.
20 
  But given their smarts and superior command over essentially everything, it is 
understandable that the rich will progressively learn to craft their self-serving ideologies so that 
they become ever-more convincing to a majority of the electorate.
21 Their disproportionate 
control over the media, educational institutions
22 and think tanks makes this outcome inevitable.  
Over the past three decades, the media—newsprint, television, and radio—have become 
increasingly concentrated into the hands of a few mega corporations.  To a significant extent,   23
this was due to deregulation.  For instance, the number of newspapers controlled by chains 
went up significantly as a result of relaxed ownership regulations (McPherson 2008: 165). Frank 
Blethen points out that “The majority of our media are controlled by just five companies [such 
that] About one-third of the population now listens to radio stations owned by a single 
company....The 1996 deregulation of radio virtually ended local ownership in that medium” 
(2004: B7).   A result of this increased media concentration is that criticisms of laissez-faire 
ideology and the corporate power structure became increasingly marginalized.   
An important component of the increasing influence of conservative, free-market 
ideology has been through the proliferation and empowerment of conservative think tanks. 
Conservative think tanks today both outnumber and overpower their liberal counterparts. By the 
mid-1990’s, conservative think tanks “came to outnumber liberal organizations by a ratio of two 
to one” (Rich 2004: 206). While the five largest conservative think tanks all had total expenses 
greater than $10 million, only the largest liberal think tank, the Center on Budget and Policy 
Priorities, could claim this feat. In fact, in 2006 the Heritage Foundation alone had larger 
expenses than the largest four liberal think tanks combined.
23 
In addition to greater support from think tanks and lobbyists, over the past 35 
years academic economists have provided increasing support to free-market ideology, 
thereby lending support to right-wing policies, even when such is not their intent.  The 
mainstream economic canon is generally supportive of unfettered and thus unregulated 
markets, even when the consequence is greater inequality.
24 
Because of the wealthy’s increased command over society’s dominant ideology, 
the losers – the overwhelming majority of Americans – have not used the political 
process to stop the super-rich rip-off.  Through the democratic process, they could force   24
the creation of compensatory measures to relieve workers harmed by technological change or 
international trade.  Taxes could have been restructured in their favor, and public services 
that benefit them such as day care, better schools, health care and public recreational 
facilities could have been vastly expanded and improved.  However, the wealthy’s 
increased control over the ideology infrastructure resulted in a majority of them buying 
into the rich’s ideology that such measures would not be either to their own or the 
country’s benefit.
25  As former chief economist at the International Monetary Fund, 
Simon Johnson, has put it, “…the American financial industry gained political power by 
amassing a kind of cultural capital – a belief system…[such that] the attitude took hold 
that what was good for Wall Street was good for the country…[and] crucial to America’s 
position in the world…. Faith in free financial markets grew into conventional wisdom – 
trumpeted on the editorial pages of The Wall Street Journal and on the floor of Congress” 
(2009).
26 
  Further, the majority were being depoliticized.  As Wolin has put it,  
“The intense pace of work and the extended working day, combined with job insecurity, 
is a formula for political demobilization, for privatizing the citizenry…[This] 
depoliticization is promoted through society’s being enveloped in an atmosphere of 
collective fear and of individual powerlessness:  fear of terrorists, loss of jobs, the 
uncertainties of pension plans, soaring health costs, and rising educational expenses” 
(2008: 239). 
  The consequences were not only that income, wealth, and privilege became more 
unequally distributed, but that with much of the electorate distracted from economic issues or 
convinced by the elite’s ever-more sophisticated ideology,  markets were deregulated and   25
necessary new regulations were blocked, thereby changing the rules of the game and setting 
the stage for financial meltdown.   
Since antiquity, interest rates were capped by usury laws, and for much of U.S. history, 
state and local laws continued to curb financial power by setting caps on interest rates and fees.  
However, a Supreme Court decision in 1978 (Marquette National Bank v. First of Omaha 
Services Corp) claimed that a state could not control interest rates charged by an out-of-state 
bank.  In addition to sweeping away usury laws, the credit card industry was also effectively 
deregulated.  U.S. court decisions were beginning to reflect the general deregulatory trend that 
was sweeping through the economy as stagflation was blamed on governmental interference in 
the workings of the economy. The result of this court decision was that contracts with consumers 
became unintelligible and banks were free to impose high interest rates, fees, and penalties.
27   
   Deregulation sped up after the 1980 election of Ronald Reagan.  The Garn-St. Germain 
Act of 1982 loosened regulation of the saving and loan industry, creating a crisis in that sector 
such that in the late 1980s, the number of S&Ls decreased by about 50 percent and about 1400 
institutions received federal monies or closed.  The Secondary Mortgage Market Enhancement Act 
of 1984 legalized mortgage-backed securities in all states.  The Grahm-Leach-Bliley Act of 
November 1999 abolished the investment limits set on banks by the Glass-Steagall Act (a 
“firewall” between investment and commercial banking).  Clearly, the wealthy had gotten better 
at waging campaigns against state controls over activities from which they drew income. As 
Johnson put it, “The great wealth that the financial sector created and concentrated gave bankers 
enormous political weight – a weight not seen in the U.S. since the era of J.P. Morgan (the man)” 
(2009).   26
  Deregulation of the financial sector (banks, insurance companies, brokerages, real 
estate, etc.) led to booming profits, hardly a surprise given that banks began charging interest 
rates on credit cards as high as 30 percent, and an increasing assortment of fees.  Further, it led to 
an explosion in so-called fringe banking such as check cashing, pawn, payday-loan and cash-
advance shops that offer services to low income households at extremely high interest rates.  
Deregulation contributed to a shift of money out of investment in the creation of real capital and 
into the financial sector.  The underinvestment in the goods-producing sector led to a weak 
export sector and increasing imports, generating an increasingly large trade deficit.  These 
dollars abroad flowed back into the U.S. financial system, helping keep interest rates low and 
fueling profitability.  And because these dollars flowed back, the trade deficit did not cause the 
value of the dollar to dramatically fall, thereby allowing the trade deficit to grow further as 
exports remained expensive and imports cheap. 
It Happened Before:  The Financial Crisis of 1929 
  In October of 1929, the stock market crashed and the Great Depression followed.  There 
were many differences in the economies that led up to the crises of 1929 and 2008.  For instance, 
in 1929, the government constituted only about three percent of GDP versus about 22 percent in 
2008.  Whereas extreme speculation on the eve of the current crisis was most visible in the real 
estate market, it was in the stock market in the late 1920s.  Yet beneath such differences were 
striking similarities.   
In both periods, taxes on the rich were substantially cut.
28  Income distribution became 
radically more unequal in both periods, meaning that households had to struggle ever-harder to 
maintain their relative social status, their social respectability.  In both periods an elite had ever-
rising amounts of money to invest, but because the non-elite had less to spend,
29 investment   27
potential was greater in the financial as opposed to the production sector.  Thus in both periods 
investment funds were being switched from production to speculation, which stimulated 
innovations in credit instruments.  Real estate bubbles were critical to both crises.  In both 
periods, a wealthy elite’s possession of an ever-rising share of society’s income enabled them 
increasing command over political ideology. In both periods, political attention was diverted 
away from economic to cultural issues.  As cultural wars divided the electorate in the post-
Reagan era, so too the 1920s saw political combat over such issues as evolution, prohibition, 
immigration, and the increasingly militant Klu Klux Klan.
30 
  By the late 1920s, about 80 percent of U.S. households had radios, bringing advertising 
into living rooms.  Radio advertising helped erode the historical thriftiness of American families.  
Households were encouraged to buy on the more value-neutral term, “credit,” as opposed to 
taking out loans.  And to enable them to better do so, installment-plan financing developed.  
Between 1913 and 1929 the ratio of private credit to Gross Domestic Product nearly doubled. 
Final Reflections 
  The argument explored in this article is not that all financial crises result from rising 
inequality, only that some do and that the current crisis, as well as the one that began in 1929, are 
examples.  During the 1920s and over the past three decades, concern about rising inequality was 
widely dismissed as either irrelevant or missing the economic dynamism that inequality 
generates.  Its irrelevance was supposedly that if everyone is becoming materially better off, the 
size of shares is unimportant.  What this discourse missed was the behavioral changes generated 
by rising inequality, changes that would make the economy increasingly vulnerable to a severe 
financial collapse.  Economic crises are as much about politics as economics, as much about 
justice as the efficiency of markets.  Further, a number of studies challenge the claim of a   28
positive relationship between inequality and economic dynamism, finding instead that greater 
income inequality causes economies to grow more slowly (Alesina and Rodrik 1994; Easterly  
2002;  Persson and Tabellini 1994). 
The crisis of 1929 marked a turning point, reversing rising inequality, and ushering in 
roughly four decades of democratically-driven policies that significantly lessened inequality.  
Might the crisis of 2008 promise to have similar distributional consequences?  Perhaps.  As 
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1 “The financial crisis was caused by significant gaps in oversight” (Geithner, cited in Cho and 
Goldfarb 2009: A14).   Because it helped maintain low interest rates, John Taylor has laid blame 
for the crisis on the Federal Reserve (2009).  
 
2 Thorstein Veblen put this as follows: 
“One’s neighbours, mechanically speaking, often are socially not one’s neighbours, or 
even acquaintances; and still their transient good opinion has a high degree of utility.  
The only practicable means of impressing one’s pecuniary ability on these unsympathetic   33
                                                                                                                                                                                           
observers of one’s everyday life is an unremitting demonstration of ability to pay” (1999: 
86-87). 
 
3  Income distribution became even more unequal than these data reveal, if the declining 
availability of public goods consumed by the less privileged is taken into account.   
 
4   There are many other ways of depicting this rising income inequality. For instance, the 
poorest 20 percent of Americans saw their share of total income decline from 5.5 percent in 1973 
to 4.0 percent in 2005.  Over the same period, the second poorest 20 percent saw their share drop 
from 11.9 to 9.6 percent, the middle 20 percent from 17.5 to 15.3.  Meanwhile, the share of the 
richest 20 percent rose from 41.1 to 48.1 percent.  And the richest five percent saw their share 
climb from 15.5 to 21.1 percent (Table 1.9, Mishel et. al. 2007).   The rise in the Gini Coefficient 
depicted in the chart below provides a graphic glimpse of this growing 
inequality
Figure 1: Gini Ratio for U.S. Households












5   An OECD study (d’Addio 2007) finds upward mobility between generations to be lower in 
the U.S. than in Canada, Sweden, Germany, Spain, Denmark, Austria, Norway, Finland, and 
France.   Further evidence that the U.S. is no longer the exceptional land of great equality of 
opportunity is provided by a number of other studies (Hertz 2007; Mishel, Bernstein, and 
Allegretto 2007; Mazumder 2005; Solon 1992). Nevertheless, the general view in the U.S. 
continues to be that it is the exceptional land of opportunity. 
  Following World War II, education served as a principal route for vertical mobility.  
However, between 1982 and 2007, college tuition and fees increased by 439 percent, far   34
                                                                                                                                                                                           
outstripping increases in the cost of medical care (251 percent), median family income (147 
percent) and the consumer price index (106 percent). (Kinzie 2008: A6).  Of families whose 
children go on to college, those with less income have been especially pinched by the increased 
costs of tuition at public colleges.  It has been found that “the percentage of an average family’s 
income needed to pay for a public four-year college has risen from 20 to 28 percent, after 
financial aid.  For community colleges, the burden has risen from nearly 20 percent to nearly 25 
percent” (National Center for Public Policy and Higher Education, reported in Kinzie 2008: A6).  
This increased cost of education has impaired the opportunities for those less well off to move up 
in status.  This study also shows that other countries are outstripping the U.S. in providing access 
to college. 
 
6 This index measures one-quarter of median family income as percent of the funds necessary to 
qualify for an 80 percent mortgage on a median-priced home. 
 
7 Undoubtedly, other forces also played a role in the declining rate of household saving.  
However, after examining the major “theories/explanations” for the fall in saving rates (wealth 
effects, “new economy” effect, financial innovation, social security programs and 
macroeconomic stability, demographics, Ricardian equivalence, and trends in the way companies 
compensate shareholders), Guidolin and La Jeunesse conclude that “none of them provides a 
compelling explanation” (2007: 491; See also Attanasio and Paiella 2001: 110).  Similarly, 
Munnell, Golub-Sass and Varani note that “Economists have spent a lot of energy attempting to 
explain the precipitous drop, but with little success” (2005: 2). 
 
8  The argument set forth here is directly opposite that of Keynes (1936: 372-75).  For Keynes, 
an increase in inequality could be expected to decrease saving since wealthier households have 
lower marginal propensities to save than do the less-well off.  What Keynes failed to take into 
account is the manner in which rising inequality pressures all households beneath the top to 
increase consumption to maintain their relative social status.  For an extended discussion of 
Veblen’s theory of consumer behavior applied to U.S. saving behavior, see Brown 2008; 
Wisman 2009. 
 
9 The securitization of credit card debt began in the early 1990s, enabling Wall Street brokers to sell 
bonds backed by credit card debt.  The new profit possibilities greatly stimulated the aggressive 
marketing of credit cards. 
 
10  As Martin Wolf has pointed out, “Nothing comparable has happened since the second world 
war, if ever.  Indeed, on average households have run small financial surpluses over the past six 
decades”  (2007: 13).  
 
11  Wenning (2008) notes that “The $6.2 trillion in debt that U.S. households took on between 
2000 and 2007 fueled much of the consumer-related growth we've experienced in the past 
decade -- on SUVs, flat-panel TVs, and granite countertops and other luxury goods.”  Increased 
availability of credit instruments such as credit cards and home equity loans greatly facilitated 
this emulative consumption (Scott 2007).  Rapid expansion of subprime mortgages dramatically   35
                                                                                                                                                                                           
augmented indebtedness, and provided the coup de grace for the financial system.  
 
12  Major manufacturing firms such as General Motors, Ford, and General Electric developed 
increasingly powerful financial departments. In the case of GM and Ford, it was to finance the sale 
of their vehicles.  By 2000, General Electric received more income from financial transactions than 
from manufacturing.   
 
13 This was equally true of pay.  Average compensation in the financial sector was close to parity 
with that of all domestic private industries between 1948 and 1982.  However, it soared to 181 
percent of the average level of other industries by 2007 (Johnson 2009). 
 
14 Between 1980 and 2000, securitized debt expanded 50-fold, whereas bank loans expanded by 
a mere 3.7-fold.  By the end of 2007, two-thirds of all private U.S. debt passed through Wall 
Street (Wilmers 2009: A19). 
 
15 In 1983, 16 percent of Americans owned stock directly or indirectly and they constituted about 
12 percent of household assets.  By the eve of the crash in 2001, over 50 percent owned stocks 
which represented 44 percent of household assets. 
 
16  George W. Bush’s tax cuts, benefiting disproportionately the rich, produced, as James 
Livingston has put it, “a new tidal wave of surplus capital with no place to go except into real 
estate” (2009: 47). 
 
17 A sustained housing boom is an especially powerful motor for powering the economy because 
ownership participation is so widespread, propelling consumption wealth effects, and because 
the construction industry is stimulated by ever-rising housing prices. 
 
18 The percentage of households holding equity in their homes had remained at about 64 percent 
between 1975 and 1995.   
 
19 A measure of the frothiness of this bubble is that by 2006, the median house price reached 
$234,000, having soared 40 percent since 2000. 
 
20 This is why it is a mistake to blame the crisis on greed.  Individuals respond to the incentive 
structures embedded in social institutions.  The task, therefore, is to pass judgment not on 
individuals, but on social institutions that provide socially destructive incentives.  The challenge 
is to craft institutions to elicit the behavior that is deemed necessary for the best social outcomes. 
  
21  Veblen believed that because the elite are emulated, their ideology would carry special weight: 
“The fact that the usages, actions, and views of the well-to-do leisure class acquire the character 
of a prescriptive canon of conduct for the rest of society, gives added weight and reach to the 
conservative influence of that class.  It makes it incumbent upon all reputable people to follow 
their lead” (Veblen 1899: 200).   
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22  Because of this greater control, education is not politically neutral.  As Bertrand Russell noted: 
“Almost all education has a political motive: it aims at strengthening some groups, 
national, religious, or even social, in the competition with other groups.  It is this motive, 
in the main, which determines the subjects taught, the knowledge offered and the 
knowledge withheld, and also decides the mental habits the pupils are expected to 
acquire” (1961: 403).   
 
23  
Organization                                            Total Expenses   Year 
Conservative Cluster    
Heritage Foundation  $39,338,591.00  2006 
Hoover Foundation  $34,130,000.00  2006 
American Enterprise Institute  $23,453,052.00  2006 
Cato Institute  $19,044,629.00  2006 
Hudson Institute  $10,622,227.00  2007 
American Legislative Exchange 
Council $6,925,550.00  2006 
National Center for Policy Analysis  $6,238,242.00  2007 
Reason Foundation  $5,860,879.00  2006 
Rutherford Institute  $1,799,221.00  2006 
Free Congress Foundation  $1,535,249.00  2005 
Sum $148,947,640.00   
    
Liberal Cluster    
Center on Budget and Policy 
Priorities $12,822,938.00  2005 
International Center for Research on 
Women $8,515,890.00  2005 
Center for Reproductive Law and 
Policy $7,802,540.00  2006 
Joint Center for Political and 
Economic Studies  $7,549,790.00  2006 
Rocky Mountain Institute $7,530,761.00  2005 
Economic Policy Instititute  $6,132,299.00  2006 
Center for Defense Information  $4,067,360.00  2004 
Worldwatch Institute  $2,878,856.00  2006 
Center for Policy Alternatives  $2,224,546.00  2006 
Inform, Inc.  $1,186,763.00  2005 
Sum $60,711,743.00   
Sum Top 4  $36,691,158.00   
     
This table is reconstructed from a table in Rich 204: 226-27.  More recent values computed using most recent data 
from IRS 990 Filings. 
24  The1995 recipient of the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences even went so far as to 
declare that “Of the tendencies that are harmful to sound economics, the most seductive, and in 
my opnion the most poisonous, is to focus on questions of distribution” (Lucas: 2004). 
 
25  The consequence is summarized as follows by political scientist Sheldon Wolin:     37
                                                                                                                                                                                           
  “That our system actually is democratic is more of an unquestioned assumption than a 
matter of public discussion, and so we ignore the extent to which antidemocratic elements have 
become systemic, integral, if not aberrant.  The evidence is there:  in widening income disparities 
and class distinctions, polarized educational systems (elite institutions with billion-dollar 
endowments versus struggling public schools and universities), health care that is denied to 
millions, national political institutions controlled by wealth and corporate power.  While these 
contrasts are frequently bemoaned, they are rarely considered as cumulative and, rarer still, as 
evidence of an antidemocratic regime” (2008: 212). 
 
26  Johnson claims that Wall Street’s ideological control of the political realm impedes an 
effective resolution of the crisis.  Evidence of this control is that “Wall Street paid out $18 
billion in year-end bonuses last year to its New York employees, after the government disbursed 
$243 billion in emergency assistance to the financial sector” (2009). 
 
27 Evidence of this unintelligibility is presented in a 2007 Federal Trade Commission study that 
found that nine out of ten mortgage customers could not figure out the up-front costs on the loan 
after examining what were relatively straightforward fixed-rate loan contracts.  One-half were 
unable to clearly identify the loan amount.  Further, almost 60 percent of those who took out 
subprime mortgages between 2002 and 2007 could have qualified for prime mortgages if they 
had been offered.   
 
28  President Calvin Coolidge and his Treasury Secretary Andrew Mellon energetically 
campaigned to drastically cut taxes on the highest incomes.  By 1928 the richest 10 percent 
received 46 percent of total income.  In their search for profitable investment outlets, they fueled 
ever-more extreme speculation. 
 
29  In 1929, 90 percent of taxpayers had less disposable income than in 1922, whereas the top one 
percent of taxpayers had disposable income 63 percent greater (Livingston 2009: 38). 
 
30  The culture wars died out once the Great Depression refocused attention on the economic 
struggle for income and jobs. 